

EDWIN R. SELBY, Editor.

EDWIN R. SELBY,  
SAML D. HARRIS, Jr. PUBLISHERS.

### Terms.

Two Dollars per annum, in advance.  
Two Dollars & Fifty Cents in six months.  
Three Dollars at the end of the year.

Advertising is ordered on by the publisher  
of the paper in the County of Putnam, January  
1st, 1837.

For the first three insertions, one square  
one dollar—each additional insertion twenty  
five cents. For one square, per annum, ten  
dollars. For one-fourth of a column, fifteen  
dollars. For half column twenty dollars—  
For one column, thirty dollars.

### MESSAGE

From the President of the United States  
to the two Houses of Congress at the  
commencement of the first session of the  
Twenty-fifth Congress.

Fellow citizens of the Senate  
and House of Representatives:

The act of the 23d of June, 1836, reg-  
ulating the deposits of the Public Mon-  
ey, and directing the employment of  
State, District, and Territorial Banks for  
that purpose, made it the duty of the Sec-  
retary of the Treasury to discontinue the  
use of such of them as should at any time  
refuse to redeem their notes in specie,  
and to substitute other banks, provided a  
sufficient number could be obtained to re-  
ceive the public deposits upon the terms  
and conditions therein prescribed. The  
general, and almost simultaneous suspen-  
sion of specie payments by the banks in  
May last, rendered the performance of  
this duty imperative, in respect to those  
which had been selected under the act,  
and made it at the same time impractic-  
able to employ the requisite number of oth-  
ers, upon the prescribed conditions. The  
specific regulations established by Con-  
gress, for the safe keeping of the public  
moneys, having thus unexpectedly become  
inoperative, I felt it to be my duty to af-  
ford you an early opportunity for the ex-  
ercise of your supervisory powers over  
the subject.

I was also led to apprehend that the  
suspension of specie payments, increas-  
ing the embarrassments before existing  
in the pecuniary affairs of the country,  
would so far diminish the public revenue  
that the accruing receipts in the Treas-  
ury, would not, with the reserved five mil-  
lions, be sufficient to defray the unavoid-  
able expenses of the Government, until  
the usual period for the meeting of Con-  
gress; whilst the authority to call upon the  
States, for a portion of the sums depos-  
ited with them, was too restricted to enable  
the department to realize a sufficient a-  
mount from that source. These appre-  
hensions have been justified by the sub-  
sequent results which render it certain  
that this deficiency will occur, if addi-  
tional means be not provided by Con-  
gress.

The difficulties experienced by the mer-  
cantile interest, in meeting their engage-  
ments, induced them to apply to me, pre-  
viously to the actual suspension of specie  
payments, for indulgence upon their  
bonds for duties; and all the relief au-  
thorized by law was promptly and cheer-  
fully granted. The dependence of the  
Treasury upon the avails of these  
bonds, to enable it to make the deposits  
with the States required by law, led me  
in the outset to limit this indulgence to  
the first of September, but it has since  
been extended to the first of October, that  
the matter might be submitted to your  
further direction.

Questions are also expected to arise in  
the recess, in respect to the October in-  
stallment of those deposits, requiring the  
interposition of Congress.

A provision of another act, passed about  
the same time, and intended to secure a  
faithful compliance with the obligation of  
the United States, to satisfy all demands  
upon them in specie or its equivalent,  
prohibited the offer of any bank note, not  
convertible on the spot into gold or sil-  
ver at the will of the holder; and the abil-  
ity of the government, with millions on  
deposit, to meet its engagements in the  
manner thus required by law, was ren-  
dered very doubtful by the event to which  
I have referred.

Sensible that adequate provisions for  
the unexpected exigencies could only be  
made by Congress; convinced that some  
of them would be indispensably necessary  
to the public service, before the regular  
period of your meeting; and desirous al-  
so to enable you to exercise, at the earli-  
est moment, your full constitutional pow-  
ers for the relief of the country, I could  
not, with propriety, avoid subjecting you  
to the inconvenience of assembling at as  
early a day as the state of the popular  
representation would permit. I am sure  
that I have done but justice to your feel-  
ings, in believing that this inconvenience  
will be cheerfully counteracted, in the  
hope of rendering your meeting conduc-  
ive to the good of the country.

During the earlier stages of the revul-  
sion through which we have just passed,  
much acrimonious discussion arose, and  
great diversity of opinion existed, as to its  
real causes. This was not surprising.—  
The operations of credit are so diversified,  
and the influences which effect them so  
numerous, and often so subtle, that even  
impartial and well-informed persons are  
seldom found to agree in respect to them.  
To inherent difficulties were also added  
other tendencies, which were by no means  
favorable to the discovery of truth. It  
was hardly to be expected that those who  
disapproved of the policy of the govern-

Vol. XIII. No 19.

RAVENNA, (Omo.) THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1837.

Whole No. 643.

# Western



# Courier.

ment in relation the currency, would, in  
the excited state of public feeling pro-  
duced by the occasion, fail to attribute  
to that policy any extensive embarrassment  
in the momentary affairs of the country.  
The matter thus became connected with  
the passions and conflicts of party; op-  
inions were more or less affected by po-  
litical considerations; and differences were  
prolonged which might otherwise have  
been determined by an appeal to facts, by  
the exercise of reason, or by mutual con-  
cession. It is, however, a cheering re-  
flection, that circumstances of this nature  
cannot prevent a community so intelligent  
as ours from ultimately arriving at cor-  
rect conclusions. Encouraged by the  
firm belief of this truth, I proceed to state  
so far as may be necessary to a clear un-  
derstanding of the remedies I feel it my  
duty to propose, and the reasons by which  
I have been led to recommend them.

The history of trade in the United  
States for the last three or four years,  
affords the most convincing evidence that  
our present condition is chiefly to be at-  
tributed to over action in all the depart-  
ments of business; an over action deriv-  
ing, perhaps, its first impulses from in-  
termediate causes, but stimulated to its  
destructive consequences by excessive is-  
sues of bank paper, and by other facili-  
ties for the acquisition and enlargement of  
credit. At the commencement of the year  
1834, the banking capital of the U. States,  
including that of the National bank then  
existing, amounted to about 200 millions  
of dollars; the bank notes then in cir-  
culation to about 85 millions; and the  
loans and discounts of the banks to  
three hundred and twenty-four millions.  
Between that time and the first of January,  
1836, being the latest period to which  
accurate accounts have been received,  
our banking capital was increased to more  
than two hundred fifty one million; our  
paper circulation to more than one hun-  
dred and forty millions, and loans and dis-  
counts to more than four hundred and  
fifty millions. To this vast increase are  
to be added the many millions of credit,  
acquired by means of foreign loans, con-  
tracted by the States and State institu-  
tions, and, above all, by the lavish ac-  
commodations extended by foreign deal-  
ers to our merchants.

The consequences of this redundancy  
of credit and of the spirit of reckless  
speculation engendered by it, were a for-  
eign debt contracted by our citizens, esti-  
mated in March last at more than thirty  
millions of dollars; the extension to tra-  
ders in the interior of our country of cre-  
dits for supplies, greatly beyond the wants  
of the people; the investment of thirty-  
nine and a half millions of dollars in un-  
productive lands, in the years 1835 and  
1836, whilst in the preceding year the  
sales amounted to only 4 1/2 millions; the  
creation of debts, to an almost countless  
amount, for real estate in existing or an-  
ticipated cities or villages, equally unpro-  
ductive, and at prices now seen to have  
been greatly disproportionate to their real  
value; the expenditures of immense  
sums in improvements which, in many  
cases, have been found to be ruinously  
imprudent; the diversion to other pur-  
suits of much labor that should have been  
applied to agriculture, thereby contrib-  
uting to the expenditure of large sums in  
the importation of grain from Europe—  
an expenditure which, amounting in 1834  
to about two hundred and fifty thousand  
dollars, was, in the first two quarters of  
the present year, increased to more than  
two millions of dollars, and finally, with-  
out enumerating other injurious results,  
the rapid growth among all the classes,  
and especially in our great commercial  
towns of luxurious habits, founded too of-  
ten on merely fancied wealth, and detri-  
mental alike to the industry, the resour-  
ces, and the morals of our people.

It was impossible that such a state of  
things could long continue, that the pros-  
pect of revulsion was present in the minds  
of considerate men before it actually  
came. None, however, had correctly  
anticipated its severity. A concurrence  
of circumstances inadequate of themselves  
to produce such wide spread and calamitous  
embarrassments, tending so greatly to  
aggravate them that they cannot be over-  
looked in considering their history. A-  
mong these may be mentioned, as most  
prominent, the great loss of capital sus-  
tained by our commercial emporium in  
the fire of December, 1835—a loss, the  
effects of which were underrated, at the  
time, because postponed for a season, by  
the great facilities of credit then existing;  
the disturbing effects of our commercial  
cities of the transfers of the the public  
moneys required by the deposit law of  
June, 1836; and the measures adopted by  
the foreign creditors of our merchants to  
reduce their debts, and to withdraw from  
the United States a large portion of our  
specie.

However unwilling our citizens may  
heretofore have been to assign to these  
causes the chief instrumentality in produ-  
cing the present state of things, the de-  
velopments subsequently made, and the  
actual condition of other commercial  
countries, must, as it seems to me, dispel  
all remaining doubts upon the subject. It

has since appeared that evils similar to  
those suffered by ourselves, have been  
experienced in Great Britain, on the con-  
tinent, and, indeed, throughout the com-  
mercial world, and that in other countries,  
as well as our own, they have been uni-  
formly preceded by an undue enlargement  
of the boundaries of trade, prompted, as  
with us, by unprecedented expansions of  
the system of credit. A reference to the  
amount of banking capital, and the issue  
of paper credits put in circulation in  
Great Britain, by banks, and in other  
ways, during the years 1834, 1835, and  
1836, will show an augmentation of the  
paper currency there, as much dispropor-  
tioned to the real wants of trade as in  
the United States. With this redun-  
dancy of the paper currency, there arose  
in that country also a spirit of adventu-  
rous speculation, embracing the whole  
range of human enterprise. Aid was pro-  
fusely given to projected improvements;  
large investments were made in foreign  
stocks and loans; credits for goods were  
granted with unbounded liberality to mer-  
chants in foreign countries; and all the  
means of acquiring or employing credit  
were put in active operation, and extended  
in their effects to every department of  
business, and to every quarter of the  
globe. The reaction was proportioned  
in its violence to the extraordinary char-  
acter of its events which preceded it.—  
The commercial community of Great  
Britain were subjected to the greatest dif-  
ficulties, and their debtors in this country  
were not only suddenly deprived of ac-  
customed and expected credits, but called  
upon for payments, which, in the actual  
posture of things here, could only be made  
through a general pressure, and at the  
most ruinous sacrifices.

In view of these facts, it would seem  
impossible for sincere inquirers after truth  
to resist the conviction, that the causes  
of the revulsion in both countries have  
been substantially the same. Two na-  
tions, the most commercial in the world,  
enjoying but recently the highest degree  
of apparent prosperity, and maintaining  
with each other the closest relations, are  
suddenly, in a time of profound peace,  
and without any great national disaster,  
arrested in their career, and plunged into  
a state of embarrassment and distress.—  
In both countries we have witnessed the  
same redundancy of paper money, and  
other facilities of credit; the same spirit  
of speculation; the same partial success-  
es; the same difficulties and reverses;  
and, at length, nearly the same over-  
whelming catastrophe. The most mate-  
rial difference between the results in the  
two countries has only been, that with  
us there has also occurred an extensive  
derangement in the fiscal affairs of the  
Federal and State Governments, occasioned  
by the suspension of specie payments  
by the banks.

The history of those causes and effects,  
in Great Britain and the United States,  
is substantially the history of the revul-  
sion in all other commercial countries.

The present and visible effects of these  
circumstances on the operations of the  
Government, and on the industry of the  
people, point out the objects which call  
for your immediate attention.

They are—to regulate by law the safe  
keeping, transfer, and disbursement, of  
the public moneys; to designate the funds  
to be received and paid by the Govern-  
ment to enable the Treasury to meet  
promptly every demand upon it; to pre-  
scribe the terms of indulgence, and the  
mode of settlement to be adopted, as well  
in collecting from individuals the revenue  
that has accrued, as in withdrawing it  
from former depositories, and to devise  
and adopt such further measures, within  
the constitutional competency of Con-  
gress, as will be best calculated to revive  
the enterprise and to promote the prosper-  
ity of the country.

For the deposit, transfer and disburse-  
ment of the revenue, National and  
State Banks have always, with temper-  
ary and limited exceptions, been hereto-  
fore employed; but, although advocates  
of each system are still to be found, it is  
apparent that the events of the last few  
months have greatly augmented the de-  
sire, long existing among the people of  
the United States, to separate the fiscal  
operations of the Government from those  
of individuals or corporations.

Again to create a national bank, as a  
fiscal agent, would be to disregard the  
popular will, twice solemnly and unequiv-  
ocally expressed. On no question of do-  
mestic policy is there stronger evidence  
that the sentiments of a large majority  
are deliberately fixed; and I cannot con-  
cur with those who think they see, in  
recent events, a proof that these senti-  
ments are, or a reason that they should be  
changed.

Events, similar in their origin and  
character, have heretofore frequently oc-  
curred, without producing any such  
change; and the lessons of experience  
must be forgotten, if we suppose that the  
present overthrow of credit would have  
been prevented by the existence of a na-  
tional bank. Proneness to excessive is-  
sues has even been the vice of the bank  
system; a vice as prominent in National

as in State institutions. This propensity  
is as subservient to the advancement of  
private interests in the one as in the  
other; and those who direct them both,  
being principally guided by the same  
views, and influenced by the same mo-  
tives, will be equally ready to stimulate  
extravagance of enterprise by improvi-  
dence of credit. How strikingly is this  
conclusion sustained by experience. The  
Bank of the United States, with the vast  
powers conferred on it by Congress, did  
not or could not prevent former and sim-  
ilar embarrassments; nor has the still greater  
strength it has been said to possess,  
under its present charter, enabled it, in  
the existing emergency, to check other  
institutions, or even to save itself. In  
Great Britain, where it has been seen,  
the same causes have been attended with  
the same effects, a National Bank, pos-  
sessing powers far greater than are asked  
for by the warmest advocates of such  
an institution here, has also proved un-  
able to prevent an undue expansion of  
credit, and the evils that flow from it.—  
Nor can I find any tenable ground for  
the re-establishment of a national bank,  
in the derangement alleged at present to  
exist in the domestic exchanges of the  
country, or in the facilities it may be  
capable of affording them. Although ad-  
vantages of this sort were anticipated  
when the first bank of the United States  
was created, they were regarded as an  
incidental accommodation; not one which  
the Federal Government was bound, or  
could be called upon, to furnish. This  
accommodation is now, indeed, after the  
lapse of not many years, demanded from  
it as among its first duties; and an omis-  
sion to aid and regulate commercial ex-  
change, is treated as a ground of loud and  
serious complaint. Such results only  
serve to exemplify the constant desire,  
among some of our citizens, to enlarge  
the powers of the Government, and ex-  
tend its control to subjects with which  
it should not interfere. They can never  
justify the creation of an institution to  
promote such objects. On the contrary,  
they justly excite among the community  
a more diligent inquiry into the charac-  
ter of those operations of trade, towards  
which it is desired to extend such peculiar  
favors.

The various transactions which bear  
the name of domestic exchanges, differ  
essentially in their nature, operation, and  
utility. One class of them consists of  
bills of exchange, drawn for the purpose  
of transferring actual capital from one  
part of the country to another, or to an-  
ticipate the proceeds of property actually  
transmitted. Bills of this description are  
highly useful in the movements of trade,  
and well deserve all the encouragement  
which can rightfully be given to them.—  
Another class is made up of bills of ex-  
change, not drawn to transfer actual cap-  
ital, nor on the credit of property trans-  
mitted, but to create fictitious capital,  
partaking at once of the character of notes  
discounted in bank, and of bank notes in  
circulation, and swelling the mass of pa-  
per credits to a vast extent in the most  
objectionable manner. These bills have  
formed, for the last few years, a large  
proportion of what are termed the do-  
mestic exchanges of the country, serving  
as the means of usurious profit, and con-  
stituting the most unsafe and precarious pa-  
per in circulation. The species of traf-  
fic, instead of being upheld, ought to be  
discountenanced by the Government and  
the people.

In transferring its funds from place to  
place, the Government is on the same  
footing with the private citizen; and may  
resort to the same legal means. It may  
do so through the medium of bills drawn  
by itself, or purchased from others; and  
in these operations it may, in a manner  
undoubtedly constitutional and legitimate,  
facilitate and assist exchanges of individ-  
uals founded on real transactions of trade.  
The extent of which this may be done,  
and the best means of affecting it, are en-  
titled to the fullest consideration. This  
has been bestowed by the Secretary of  
the Treasury, and his views will be submitted  
to you in his report.

But it was not designed by the Consti-  
tution that the Government should assume  
the management of domestic or foreign  
exchange. It is indeed authorized to reg-  
ulate by law the commerce between the  
States, and to provide a general standard  
of value or medium of exchange, in gold  
and silver, but it is not its province to aid  
individuals in the transfer of their funds,  
otherwise than through the facilities af-  
forded by the Post Office Department.  
As justly might it be called on to provide  
for the transportation of their merchan-  
dise. These are operations of trade.—  
They ought to be conducted by those  
who are interested in them, in the same  
manner that the incidental difficulties of  
other pursuits are encountered by other  
classes of citizens. Such aid has not  
been deemed necessary in other coun-  
tries, as well as the foreign exchanges are  
carried on by private houses, often if not gen-  
erally, without the assistance of banks. Yet  
they extend throughout distinct sovereign-  
ties, and far exceed in amount the real

exchanges of the United States.—There  
is no reason why our own may not be con-  
ducted in the same manner, with equal  
cheapness and safety. Certainly this  
might be accomplished, if it were favored  
by those most deeply interested, and few  
can doubt that their own interest, as well  
as the general welfare of the country,  
would be promoted by leaving such a sub-  
ject in the hands of those to whom it  
properly belongs.

A system founded on private interest,  
enterprise and competition, without the  
aid of legislative grants or regulations by  
law, would rapidly prosper; it would be  
free from the influence of political agita-  
tion, and would put an end to those  
complaints of neglect, partiality, in-  
justice, and oppression, which are the un-  
avoidable results of interference by the  
government, in the proper concerns of in-  
dividuals. All former attempts on the  
part of the Government to carry its leg-  
islation, in this respect, further than was  
designed by the Constitution, have in the  
end proved injurious, and have served only  
to convince the great body of the people,  
more and more, of the certain dangers of  
blending private interests with the oper-  
ations of public business; and there is no  
reason to suppose that a repetition of them  
now would be more successful.

It cannot be concealed that there exists,  
in our community, opinions and feelings  
on this subject in direct opposition to  
each other. A large portion of them  
combining great intelligence, activity and  
influence, are no doubt sincere in their  
belief that the operations of trade ought  
to be assisted by such a connection; they  
regard a national bank as necessary for  
this purpose, and they are disinclined  
to every measure that does not tend, sooner  
or later to the establishment of such an  
institution. On the other hand, a major-  
ity of the people are believed to be irre-  
concilably opposed to that measure; they  
consider such a concentration of power  
dangerous to their liberties; and many of  
them regard it as a violation of the Con-  
stitution. This collision of opinion has,  
doubtless, caused much of the embarrass-  
ment to which the commercial transaction  
of the country have lately been exposed.  
Banking has become a political topic of  
the highest interest, and trade has suffer-  
ed in the conflict of parties. A speedy  
termination of this state of things, how-  
ever desirable, is scarcely to be expected.  
We have seen for nearly half a century  
that those who advocate a National Bank,  
by whatever motive they may be influ-  
enced, constitute a portion of our commu-  
nity too numerous to allow us to hope for  
an early abandonment of their favorite  
plan. On the other hand, they must in-  
deed form an erroneous estimate of the  
intelligence and temper of the American  
people, who suppose that they have  
continued on slight or insufficient grounds,  
their persevering opposition to such an  
institution or that they can be induced by  
pecuniary pressure or by any other com-  
bination of circumstances, to surrender  
principles they have so long and so inflex-  
ibly maintained.

My own views of the subject are un-  
changed. They have been repeatedly and  
unreservedly announced to my fellow citi-  
zens; who, with full knowledge of them,  
conferred upon me the two highest offices  
of the Government. On the last of these  
occasions, I felt it due to the people to  
apprize them distinctly, that, in the event  
of my election, I would not be able to  
co-operate in the re-establishment of a  
National Bank. To these sentiments, I  
have now only to add the expression of an  
increased conviction, that the re-establish-  
ment of such a bank, in any form, whilst  
it would not accomplish the beneficial  
purpose promised by its advocates, would  
impair the rightful supremacy of the pop-  
ular will; injure the character and dimin-  
ish the influence of our political system;  
and bring once more into existence, con-  
centrated moneyed power, hostile to the  
spirit, and threatening the permanency  
of our republican institutions.

Local Banks have been employed for  
the deposit and distribution of the reve-  
nue, at all times partially, and, on three  
different occasions exclusively; first, an-  
terior to the establishment of the first  
Bank of the United States; secondly, in  
the interval between the termination of  
that institution and the charter of its suc-  
cessor; and, thirdly, during the limited  
period which has now so abruptly closed.  
The connection thus repeatedly attempt-  
ed, proved unsatisfactory on each suc-  
cessive occasion, notwithstanding the various  
measures which were adopted to facilitate  
or insure its success. On the last occa-  
sion, in the year 1833, the employment of  
the State Banks was guarded especially,  
in every way which experience and cau-  
tion could suggest. Personal security  
was required for the safe keeping and  
prompt payment of the moneys to be re-  
ceived, and full returns of their condition  
were, from time to time, to be made by  
the depositories. In the first stages the  
measure was eminently successful, not-  
withstanding the violent opposition of the  
Bank of the United States, and the un-

ceasing efforts made to overthrow it.—  
The selected banks performed with fideli-  
ty, and without any embarrassment to  
themselves or the community, then en-  
gagements to the Government, and the  
system promised to be permanently use-  
ful. But when it became necessary, un-  
der the act of June, 1836, to withdraw  
from them the public money, for the  
purpose of placing it in additional insti-  
tutions, or of transferring it to the States,  
they found it, in many cases, inconvenient  
to comply with the demands of the Treas-  
ury, and numerous and pressing applica-  
tions were made for indulgence or re-  
lief. As the instalments under the depo-  
site law became payable, their own embarras-  
sments, and the necessity under which  
they lay of curtailing their discounts and  
calling in their debts, increased the gen-  
eral distress, and contributed, with other  
causes, to hasten the revulsion in which,  
at length, they, in common with the other  
banks, were fatally involved.

Under these circumstances, it becomes  
our solemn duty to inquire whether there  
are not, in any connection between the  
Government and banks of issue, evils of  
great magnitude, inherent in its very na-  
ture, and against which no precautions  
can effectually guard.

Unforeseen in the organization of the  
Government, and forced on the Treasury  
by early necessities, the practice of em-  
ploying banks, was, in truth, from the  
beginning, more a measure of emergency  
than of sound policy. When we started  
into existence as a nation, in addition to  
the burdens of the new Government, we  
assumed all the large but honorable load  
of debt which was the price of our lib-  
erty, but we hesitated to weigh down the  
infant industry of the country by resort-  
ing to adequate taxation for the necessary  
revenue. The facilities of banks, in re-  
turn for the privileges they acquired,  
were promptly offered, and perhaps too  
readily received, by an embarrassed  
Treasury. During the long continuance  
of a national debt, and the intervening  
difficulties of a foreign war, the connec-  
tion was continued from motives of con-  
venience; but these causes have long  
since passed away. We have no emer-  
gencies that make banks necessary to aid  
the wants of the Treasury; we have no  
load of national debt to provide for, and  
we have on actual deposits a large sur-  
plus. No public interest, therefore, now  
requires the renewal of a connection that  
circumstances have dissolved. The com-  
plete organization of our Government,  
the abundance of our resources, the gen-  
eral harmony which prevails between the  
different States, and with foreign Powers,  
all enable us now to select the system  
most consistent with the Constitution, and  
most conducive to the public welfare.—  
Should we, then, connect the Treasury  
for a fourth time with the local banks, it  
can only be under a conviction that past  
failures have arisen from accidental, not  
inherent defects.

A danger, difficult, if not impossible, to  
be avoided in such an arrangement, is  
made strikingly evident in the very event  
by which it has now been defeated. A  
sudden act of the banks intrusted with  
the funds of the people, deprives the  
Treasury, without fault or agency of the  
Government, of the ability to pay its  
creditors in the currency they have by  
law a right to demand. This circum-  
stance no fluctuation of commerce could  
have produced, if the public revenue had  
been collected in the legal currency, and  
kept in that form by the officers of the  
Treasury. The citizen whose money  
was in bank receives it back, since the  
suspension, at a sacrifice in its amount;  
whilst he who kept it in the legal curren-  
cy of the country and in his own pos-  
session, pursues, without loss, the current  
of his business. The Government, placed  
in the situation of the former, is involved  
in embarrassments, it could not have suf-  
fered had it pursued the course of the  
latter. The embarrassments are, more-  
over, augmented by those salutary and  
just laws which forbid it to use a depre-  
ciated currency, and, by so doing, take  
from the Government the ability which  
individuals have of accommodating their  
transactions to such a catastrophe.

A system which can, in a time of pro-  
found peace, when there is a large reve-  
nue laid by, thus suddenly prevent the ap-  
plication and the use of the money of the  
people, in the manner and for the object  
they have directed, cannot be wise; but  
who can think, without painful reflection,  
that, under it the same unforeseen events  
might have befallen us in the midst of a  
war, and taken from us, at the moment  
when the most wanted, those very means  
which were treasured up to promote the  
national welfare and guard our national  
rights? To such embarrassment and to  
such dangers will this Government be al-  
ways exposed, whilst it takes the moneys  
raised for, and necessary to, the public  
service, out of the hands of its own officers  
and converts them into a mere right of  
action against corporations entrusted with  
the possession of them.—Nor can such  
results be effectually guarded against in  
such a system, without investing the Ex-  
ecutive with a control over banks them-  
selves, whether State or national, that  
might with reason be objected to. Ours  
is probably the only Government in the  
world that is liable, in the management of  
its fiscal concerns, to occurrences like  
these. But this imminent risk is not the  
only risk attendant on the surrender of  
the public money to the custody and con-  
trol of local corporations. Though the  
object is to aid the Treasury, its ef-  
fect may be to introduce into the opera-  
tions of the Government, influences the